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Author’s Introduction 
Eighteenth-century philosophers engage in lively debates about persons and personal 
identity. Many of these debates were prompted by John Locke’s publication of his 
chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (II.xxvii), which he added to the second edition of 
his An Essay concerning Human Understanding in 1694. Locke’s thinking about 
persons and personal identity is innovative in many respects. For instance, Locke 
argues that the idea of a person should be distinguished from the ideas of a human 
being and a substance. For Locke, personal identity consists in sameness of 
consciousness and persons rather than human beings or substances are held 
accountable for their actions and continue to exist in the afterlife. Locke’s novel views 
were widely discussed soon after their publication. Although Locke had some 
defenders such as Catharine Trotter Cockburn, he also had many critics. Many of his 
critics attack his position on metaphysical and/or religious grounds. However, 
Locke’s view can also be questioned on moral grounds. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury (hereafter “Shaftesbury”), offers an alternative approach to 
persons and personal identity, which is shaped by his virtue-ethical moral views and 
his belief that philosophy should be practical. He shifts the focus of traditional 
metaphysical debates about personal identity towards practical questions of self-
improvement. His approach to persons and personal identity has a developmental 
dimension, which focuses on personal growth and improvement of character. Personal 
development is a gradual process and a practical project of life. Including 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy in a course on philosophical debates about persons and 
personal identity has the advantage that it can lead to interesting discussion 
concerning the role of ethics and metaphysics in theories of persons and personal 
identity. For instance, one can ask in what sense approaches to persons and personal 
identity can or should be normative, ethical or practical.  
 
 
	
Author Recommends:  
 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Chapter 11 focuses on Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s responses to Locke’s account of persons 
and personal identity. Both philosophers generally share Locke’s metaphysically agnostic 
views, but disagree with Locke on moral and religious grounds. Contrasting their moral and 
religious views brings to light how their different moral and religious views shape their 
thinking about persons and personal identity and why Shaftesbury and Hume develop views 
that differ from Locke’s position. 
 
Boeker, Ruth (2019). ‘Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery.’ International Journal 
of Philosophical Studies 27 (5): 731–752. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1674362 
This paper argues that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-
mastery and thus a version of positive liberty. It claims that self-mastery, as Shaftesbury 
understands it, is a developmental process, and shows that this interpretation is more 
promising than other attempts to situate Shaftesbury’s view within debates among 
compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
 
Gill, Michael B. (2016). ‘Love of Humanity in Shaftesbury’s Moralists.’ British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy 24(6): 1117–1135. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1198303 
This paper offers a close examination of Shaftesbury’s account of virtue in his work The 
Moralists. Shaftesbury regards virtue in its full perfection as love of all of humanity, but also 
raises doubt whether humans are capable of such abstract love of humanity. This tension 
whether humans are capable to act in the way that virtue requires arises, Gill argues, because 
Shaftesbury is a rationalist about the content of morality and a sentimentalist about moral 
motivation. 
 
Jaffro, Laurent (2008). ‘Shaftesbury on the “Natural Secretion” and Philosophical 
Personae.’ Intellectual History Review 18(3): 349–359. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17496970802319235 
This paper focuses on Shaftesbury’s views of self-fashioning and argues that his concept of a 
philosophical persona, which has a private and a public side, builds on Stoic philosophy. 
Jaffro draws particular attention to Shaftesbury’s unpublished personal notebooks, titled 
Askêmata (meaning exercises). In Askêmata Shaftesbury introduces a distinction between the 
natural self, which is in charge of self-government, and the economical self, which 
administers relations with others. Both selves have a normative dimension, since the natural 
self is tasked to consider how one ought to govern oneself and the economical self how one 
ought to manage one’s sociable part and outward character. 
 
Jaffro, Laurent (2014). ‘Cyrus’ Strategy: Shaftesbury on Human Frailty and the Will.’ 
In Patrick Müller (Ed.), New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today 
(153–165). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
This paper focuses on Shaftesbury’s conception of the will. Jaffro analyses Shaftesbury’s 
different conceptions of self-control, namely naïve beliefs that one can control one’s passions, 
an avoidance strategy, and Stoic self-discourse, or soliloquy. Since Shaftesbury regards 
constancy of the will as closely intertwined with questions of personal identity, Jaffro argues 
that Shaftesbury directly connects metaphysical questions of personal identity with normative 
identity.  
 
Purviance, Susan M. (2004). ‘Shaftesbury on Self as a Practice.’ Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 2(2): 154–163. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2004.2.2.154 
This paper emphasizes that Shaftesbury’s approach to self is practical or ethical, rather than 
theoretical or metaphysical and shows how his view differs from Hume’s and Reid’s views. 
According to Purviance, Shaftesbury’s account of self is a practical project of life that aims at 
integrity and unity is constituted by these attempts to reach integrity.  
 
Thiel, Udo (2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and Personal Identity 
from Descartes to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
This book includes a section on Shaftesbury’s criticism of Locke’s account of personal 
identity (section 5.2.5), discusses Shaftesbury’s contribution to debates about self and 
personal identity (section 7.2), and comments on Hume’s reference to Shaftesbury in Treatise 
1.4.6 (section 12.3). Thiel considers Shaftesbury’s approach to the self in the context of 
Shaftesbury’s discussion of the self of the universe, which he also calls a universal mind. 
Thiel regards Shaftesbury’s account of the self as an immaterial substance view and argues 
that Shaftesbury’s philosophy is not just ethical, but also metaphysical. 
 
Winkler, Kenneth P. (2000) ‘“All is Revolution in Us”: Personal Identity in Shaftesbury 
and Hume.’ Hume Studies 26(1): 3–40. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0311 
This paper examines debates and controversies in early modern philosophy of whether the 
topic of personal identity is metaphysical or ethical and shows with particular focus on 
Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s philosophy how philosophical positions shift during this period. 
Winkler explains how Shaftesbury moves beyond Locke’s philosophy and argues that 
Shaftesbury locates personal identity in the will, rather than the understanding. Since the will 
can be seen as a seat of active principles, persons for Shaftesbury play an active role in their 
constitution.   
 
Yaffe, Gideon (2002). ‘Earl of Shaftesbury.’ In Steven Nadler (Ed.), A Companion to 
Early Modern Philosophy (425–436). Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
This chapter offers a helpful introduction to Shaftesbury’s life, major works, and his 
philosophical contributions to British moral philosophy and aesthetics. 
 
Online Materials:  
 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on Shaftesbury: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shaftesbury/  
 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on Shaftesbury: 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/shaftes/ 
 
Shaftesbury Project: 
https://www.angam.phil.fau.de/fields/enst/lit/shaftesbury/ 
 
Sample Syllabus:  
 
The following is a partial sample syllabus for a graduate course on debates about personal 
identity in early modern philosophy. The course can also be taught as an advanced 
undergraduate course, though depending on student level and ability it may make sense to 
reduce the assigned and suggested further readings. Since many students will have 
encountered concepts such as identity or personal identity in a variety of different contexts, I 
find it helpful to begin the course with systematic reflections on the different philosophical 
questions concerning identity and personal identity, paying particular attention to 
metaphysical and ethical issues. 
The following partial syllabus begins with Locke, but other historical authors can be 
covered during early weeks. For instance, one can include a week or two on Descartes’s 
understanding of mind and body and Locke’s criticism of Cartesian views and examine the 
historical and philosophical context in which Locke developed his view about persons and 
personal identity. Many more seventeenth and eighteenth-century thinkers contribute to the 
philosophical debates about persons and personal identity than can be included in a single 
course. My course aims to engage both with the metaphysical and the ethical debates 
concerning personal identity. Thus, I selected authors who make interesting contributions to 
the metaphysics of personal identity (e.g. Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid, Cockburn, Clarke, 
Collins, Hume) and ethical questions concerning personal identity (e.g. Locke, Molyneux, 
Leibniz, Law, Shaftesbury, Hume). It is possible to end the course by turning to the reception 
and development of the early modern debates about personal identity in twentieth and twenty-
first century philosophy.  
 
 
 
Week 1: Locke on Identity 
 
How does Locke approach questions of identity over time? In what, if any, sense does his 
account of identity over time depend on the kind of being under consideration? How do 
relative identity theories differ from coincidence interpretations? Is Locke committed to either 
type of interpretation? 
 
 
Reading: 
 
Locke, John (1975 [1690]). An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter H. 
Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Book II, chapter xxvii (with focus on Locke’s general 
approach to identity in the first half of the chapter) 
Chappell, Vere (1989). ‘Locke and Relative Identity.’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 6: 69–
83. 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
‘*’ denotes highly recommended 
 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, chapters 2–3. 
Gordon-Roth, Jessica (2015). ‘Locke’s Place-Time-Kind Principle.’ Philosophy Compass 
10(4): 264–274. 
Hoffman, Joshua (1980). ‘Locke on Whether a Thing Can Have Two Beginnings of Existence.’ 
Ratio 22(2): 106–111. 
Kaufman, Dan (2007). ‘Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds.’ 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(3): 499–534. 
Rickless, Samuel C. (2014). Locke. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, ch. 8. 
*Stuart, Matthew (2013). Locke’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013, ch. 7. 
 
 
 
Week 2: Locke on Persons and Personal Identity 
 
How does Locke characterize a person? What does Locke mean when he states that ‘person’ 
is a forensic term? How does Locke account for personal identity over time? What role do 
questions of moral accountability play in Locke’s theory? How do Locke’s and Leibniz’s 
views about identity, persons, and personal identity differ? Do you find Locke’s or Leibniz’s 
view more convincing? How could Locke respond to Leibniz’s claim that the testimony of 
others could fill the gaps in one’s recollection? What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
Law’s reading of Locke? 
 
 
Reading: 
 
Locke, Essay, II.xxvii. 
Selections from Locke’s correspondence with William Molyneux. In John Locke (1976–
1989), The Correspondence of John Locke. Edited by E. S. de Beer, 8 volumes. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, letter no 1685, 4:767–768, letter no 1693, 4:784–787.  
Leibniz, Gottfried (1996). New Essays on Human Understanding. Edited by Peter Remnant 
and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Book II, chapter xxvii. 
Law, Edmund (1824 [1769]). A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Account of Personal Identity. In John 
Locke, The Works of John Locke. 12th ed., 9 volumes. London: Printed for C. and J. 
Rivington et al, 2:301–320. Accessible electronically via 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=7
62&Itemid=28 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, ch. 4. 
Boeker, Ruth (2014). ‘The Moral Dimension in Locke’s Account of Persons and Personal 
Identity.’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 31(3): 229–247. 
Curley, Edwin (1982). ‘Leibniz and Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity.’ In Michael 
Hooker (Ed.), Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays (303–326). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.  
Gordon-Roth, Jessica (2015). ‘Locke on the Ontology of Persons.’ Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 53(1): 97–125. 
LoLordo, Antonia (2012). Locke’s Moral Man. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 2. 
Mackie, J. L. (1976). Problems from Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 6. 
Spector, Jessica (2008). ‘The Grounds of Moral Agency: Locke’s Account of Personal 
Identity.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 5(2): 256–281. 
Tabb, Kathryn (2018). ‘Madness as Method: Locke’s Thought Experiments about Personal.’ 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(5): 871–889. 
Weinberg, Shelley (2011). ‘Locke on Personal Identity.’ Philosophy Compass 6(6): 398–407. 
 
 
 
Week 3: Common Objections: Circularity and Transitivity  
 
Is Locke’s account of personal identity circular? If so, in what sense? How could Locke 
respond to the circularity worry? Is the transitivity objection a serious problem for Locke’s 
theory? Recently Matthew Stuart (and Galen Strawson) have argued that Locke’s theory is 
non-transitive. What are the strength and weaknesses of non-transitive interpretations? 
 
 
Reading: 
 
Butler, Joseph (1897 [1736]). ‘Of Personal Identity.’ In Joseph Butler, The Works of Joseph 
Butler. Edited by W. E. Gladstone, 2 volumes (1:317–325). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reprinted in John Perry (Ed.) (2008). Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California 
Press (2nd ed.), 99–105. 
Reid, Thomas (2002 [1785]). ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity.’ In Thomas 
Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man. Edited by Derek R. Brookes. Edinburgh” 
Edinburgh University Press, Essay III, chapter vi, 275–279. Reprinted in Perry (Ed.), 
Personal Identity, 113–118. 
Stuart, Matthew (2013). Locke’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch. 8. 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, chapters 6 and 8.  
Garrett, Don (2003). ‘Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and “Fatal Error”.’ 
Philosophical Topics 31(1/2): 95–125. 
Gordon-Roth, Jessica (2019). ‘Tracing Reid’s “Brave Officer” Objection Back to Berkeley—
and Beyond.’ Berkeley Studies 28: 3–22. 
Strawson, Galen (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
chapters 10–12. 
*Thiel, Udo (2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and Personal Identity from 
Descartes o Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 6.  
 
 
 
Week 4: On the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul 
 
Several of Locke’s early critics worry that his view undermines the immateriality and 
immortality of the soul. Are there any good arguments for the view that persons are 
immaterial substances? Does immortality presuppose immateriality? Catharine Trotter 
Cockburn presents clever arguments to defend Locke’s view against anonymously published 
objections. How does Cockburn argue against the view that the soul always thinks? How does 
she defend the possibility of thinking matter? Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins discuss the 
possibility of thinking matter in their correspondence. Clarke endorses immaterialism and 
rejects the possibility of thinking matter, while Collins believes that it is possible that matter 
can think. Which view do you find more convincing, and why? 
 
 
Reading: 
 
Cockburn, Catharine Trotter (2006 [1702]). A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human 
Understanding. In Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Philosophical Writings. Edited by Patricia 
Sheridan. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 53–63. 
Uzgalis, William (2008). ‘Selections from the Clarke-Collins Correspondence.’ In John Perry 
(Ed.). Personal Identity (283–314). Berkeley: University of California Press (2nd ed.). 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). ‘Locke on Being Self to My Self.’ In Patricia Kitcher (Ed.), The 
Self: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, especially section 5. 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, ch. 10. 
Ducharme, Howard (1986). ‘Personal Identity in Samuel Clarke.’ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 24(3): 359–383. 
*Gordon-Roth, Jessica (2015). ‘Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Defence of Locke.’ The Monist 
98(1): 64–76. 
Hume, David (2007 [1739–40]). A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton 
and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1.4.5. Accessible electronically via 
https://davidhume.org/texts/t/1/4/5 
Hume, David (1994). ‘Of the Immortality of the Soul.’ In David Hume, Essays Moral, 
Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 590–598. 
Accessible electronically via https://davidhume.org/texts/is/ 
Lähteenmäki, Vili (2014). ‘Anthony Collins and the Status of Consciousness.’ Vivarium 
52(3–4): 315–332. 
*Rozemond, Marleen (2009). ‘Can Matter Think? The Mind-Body Problem in the Clarke-
Collins Correspondence.’ In Jon Miller (Ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind 
(171–192). Dordrecht: Springer.  
Thiel, Udo (1998). ‘Locke and the Eighteenth-Century Materialist Conceptions of Personal 
Identity.’ The Locke Newsletter 29: 59–83. Reprinted in Udo Thiel (Ed.). Locke: 
Metaphysics and Epistemology. Adlershot: Ashgate, 2002. 
Thomas, Emily (2015). ‘Catharine Cockburn on Unthinking Immaterial Substance: Souls, 
Space, and Related Matters.’ Philosophy Compass 10(4): 255–263. 
Uzgalis, William (2008). ‘Locke and Collins, Clarke and Butler, on Successive Persons.’ In 
John Perry (Ed.), Personal Identity (315–326). Berkeley: University of California Press 
(2nd ed.). 
 
 
 
Week 5: Shaftesbury 
 
How does Shaftesbury approach questions of self and personal identity? How does 
Shaftesbury criticize bodily and psychological accounts of personal identity? What is his 
positive approach to self and personal identity? What role does, can, or should character 
development or self-improvement play in theories of selfhood and personal identity? Too 
what extent is Shaftesbury’s view normative, ethical or practical? Too what extent is his view 
metaphysical? 
 
 
Reading:  
 
Shaftesbury, Antony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of (2001 [1711]). Characteristicks of Men 
Manners, Opinions, Times. Edited by Douglas Den Uyl, 3 volumes. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund. Accessible electronically via http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/shaftesbury-
characteristicks-of-men-manners-opinions-times-3-vols  
[Vol. 1] Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author Part I, Sect. 1–2, 1:97–118; Part III, Sect. 1, 
1:173–187. 
[Vol. 2] The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsodie, Part II, Sect. 1–2, 2:125–146; Part III, 
Sect. 1, 2:191–205. 
[Vol. 3] Miscellany IV, chapter 1, 3:116–128. 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
*Boeker, Ruth (2018). ‘Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development.’ 
Philosophy Compass 13(1): e12471. 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, ch. 11. 
Gill, Michael (2017). ‘Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury].’ 
In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shaftesbury/  
Jaffro, Laurent (2008). ‘Shaftesbury on the “Natural Secretion” and Philosophical Personae.’ 
Intellectual History Review 18(3): 349–359. 
Jaffro, Laurent (2014). ‘Cyrus’s Strategy: Shaftesbury on Human Frailty and the Will.’ In 
Patrick Müller (Ed.), New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today (153–
165). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.  
Purviance, Susan M. (2004). ‘Shaftesbury on Self as a Practice.’ Journal of Scottish Philosophy 
2(2): 155–163. 
Winkler, Kenneth P. (2000). ‘“All is Revolution in Us”: Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and 
Hume.’ Hume Studies 26(1): 3–40. 
 
 
 
Week 6: Hume on Personal Identity as regards our Thought and Imagination 
 
What are Hume’s negative claims about the self? What are Hume’s positive claims about the 
self? How does Hume explain our belief in personal identity over time? Is Hume’s 
philosophical project metaphysical, psychological, or sceptical? What exactly is the problem 
that Hume identifies in the Appendix? How does Hume’s view differ from Locke’s? How 
could Locke respond to Hume? 
 
 
Reading: 
 
Hume, David (2007 [1739–40]). A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton 
and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1.4.6 and Appendix. Accessible 
electronically via https://davidhume.org/texts/t/ 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
Baxter, Donald L. M. (2008). Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise. New York: 
Routledge. 
Boeker, Ruth (forthcoming). Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, ch. 11. 
Cottrell, Jonathan (2015). ‘Minds, Composition, and Hume’s Skepticism in the Appendix.’ 
Philosophical Review 124(4): 533–569. 
*Garrett, Don (1997). Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, ch. 8. 
Hume, Treatise, 1.4.2. 
*McIntyre, Jane L. (2009). ‘Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity.’ In David Fate Norton 
and Jacqueline Taylor (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume (177–208), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Strawson, Galen. The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Thiel, Udo (2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and Personal Identity from 
Descartes to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 12 and 13. 
 
 
 
Week 7: Hume on Personal Identity as it regards our Passions and Concern in 
Ourselves 
 
What is the relation between Hume’s account of self in Book 1 and in Book 2 of the Treatise? 
Has Hume changed his view? What role do self and other people play in Hume’s account of 
the indirect passions, namely pride and humility, and love and hatred? In what way do other 
people contribute to the constitution of a self? How is a Humean self connected with the past 
and future?  
 
 
Reading: 
 
Hume, Treatise, 2.1.1–7, 11 and 2.2.1–5, 9. 
 
 
Suggested further reading: 
 
Baier, Annette C. (1991). A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ch. 6. 
Boeker, Ruth (2015). ‘Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious 
Differences.’ Hume Studies 41(2): 105–135. 
Hume, Treatise, 2.1–2, 3.3.1–3, 3.3.6.  
*McIntyre, Jane (1989). ‘Personal Identity and the Passions.’ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 27(4): 545–557. 
*Taylor, Jacqueline (2015). ‘Sympathy, Self, and Others.’ In Cambridge Companion to Hume’s 
Treatise, edited by Donald C. Ainslie and Annemarie Butler (188–205). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Jacqueline (2015). Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy and Society in Hume’s 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wright, John P.  Hume’s ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, ch. 6. 
 
Focus Questions  
 
1. How does Shaftesbury criticize psychological accounts of personal identity? 
2. Do you find Shaftesbury’s criticism of psychological accounts of personal 
identity convincing? Why, or why not? 
3. What is Shaftesbury’s own positive approach to persons and personal identity? 
4. To what extent is Shaftesbury’s approach to persons and personal identity 
normative, ethical or practical, and to what extent is it metaphysical? 
5. Are questions or personal development connected with questions of personal 
identity? Or are these separate philosophical issues? 
 
 
 
